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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 09/07/2011 Accident number: 732 
Accident time: Not recorded Accident Date: 17/04/2007 
Where it occurred: CBU 186, Area 7 Al - 
Smaaieh 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 01/06/2007 
ID original source: BOI 007/07 Name of source: UN MACC SL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: M77 Submunition Ground condition: pylons and surrounds 
route (verge) 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 09/07/2011 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: UTM: 708166/678141 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this incident was made available by the UN MACC SL in 2008. Its conversion 
into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets 
[ ] is editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
File Reference: BOI 007/07 
MINE ACTION COORDINATION CENTRE, SOUTHERN LEBANON, BAC INCIDENT 
REPORT 008/2007 
1 
Report on Incident that occurred on the 17th April 2007 at CBU 186, Area 7 Al - Smaaieh 
INVESTIGATION REPORT ON MISSED SUB-MUNITION AT CBU 186, AREA 7 AL - 
SMAAIEH 
The Incident occurred on April 17 2007 in Area 7 on a Completed Site (CBU 186),  
UTM 708166 - 678141, where a Sub-Munition was located, sub-surface, during construction 
work. 
References: 
• Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) 
• International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
• [Demining group] Completion file CBU 186 
 
Introduction 
1.  In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSG’s), the MACC 
SL Programme Manager, Mr. [Name removed] and Lt.Col [Name removed], NDO 
Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on 17th April 2007, for an incident 
investigation independent inquiry.  The MACC SL board members are Capt [Name removed] 
LAF Operations Officer MACC SL and [Name removed], QA Officer MACC SL. 
2.  This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Demining Incident that 
occurred on the 17th April 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation and [Demining 
group] Completion file CBU 186 
 
Date: 17th April 2007 
Time of Incident: 171200hrs April 2007 
Location: AL - SMAAIEH, Area 7-004, Lebanon 
Task: CBU-186, Task Dossier 7-004 
BM UTM: 708166 - 678141 
Task Start / Finish Date: 17th September to 14th October 06 
Reported by: [Demining group] TFM, [Name removed] 
Reported to: Operations Officer, [Name removed], MACC SL 
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: Approx.  1230hrs 17th April 2007 
MA Organisation POC: [Name removed], Technical Operations Manager 
Investigation Date/Time: 17th April 07, PM  
Investigation Location: Task CBU-186 
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations Officer and [Name removed], 
MACC SL QA Officer. 
Explosive Ordnance Type:  M77 Sub-Munition 
Background 
4. CBU 186 was completed on the 14th October 06, see annex A for [Demining group] 
Completion Report. According to the Completion Report the task was a combination of 
surface and sub-surface clearance in accordance with the operational clearance plan.  
2 
Events leading up to the Incident 
5. The CBU was located when an excavator dug out an irrigation canal beside a road that 
cuts right through CBU 186. 
Events following the Incident 
6. The sub-munition was destroyed 17th April 2007, as directed by MACC SL. 
BOI Post Incident Activities and General Observations 
7. On the inspection of the incident site on the 17th April 2007 the following observation was 
established: 
• The sub-munition was located on the surface, in a declared, sub-surface cleared 
area. 
• The sub-munition was removed from a mound of soil that had been excavated from 
an area adjacent to a road, during excavation of a retaining wall and then the sub-
munition was placed in this area. 
• The [Demining group] completion documents indicated the area was sub-surface 
cleared, however where the clearance bordered the road and where overhead power 
lines were present the area was only surface cleared due to interference when 
operating detectors. Sub-surface clearance had taken place approx. 2-3m from the 
edge of the road to reduce interference form overhead power cables. 
 
 Geography and Weather 
8. CBU 186 is located in the Province of Tyre, with the nearest Town being AL - SMAAIEH  
Conclusions 
9. Based on the investigation, the documentation and visit to the site, the BOI concludes the 
following: 
• The sub-munition was found, sub-surface, in an area that had been visually 
searched. 
• The sub-munition was found in an area declared being sub-surfaced cleared. 
• There is a discrepancy between the actual clearance conducted and the Completion 
documents. 
 
Recommendations 
10. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions: 
• Sub-surface clearance of the area adjacent to the road 
• It is imperative that all clearance documentation accurately reflects the clearance 
conducted. 
• [Demining group] to submit a report  
 
Signed: [Name removed], QA Officer, MACC SL. Capt [Name removed], LAF Operations 
Officer, NDO/MACC SL  
June 1 2007 
 
Annex: [Demining group] Completion File CBU 186, available at the MACC SL. [Not made 
available.] 
 
3 
Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA: [None] 
[Name removed], UN Chief QA, MACC SL: [None] 
[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL: [None] 
Comments by the UN Programme Manager, MACC SL: [None] 
 
Analysis 
The Primary cause of this incident is listed as Inadequate training because the demining 
group apparently had detectors that could not operate near power lines, (if they had the 
detector reported in other incidents, they simply did not know how to use the detector near 
power lines). Their failure to recognise that there are other procedures that can be used when 
detectors are inappropriate was another example of a training inadequacy. The secondary 
cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the demining group reported 
the area as having been sub-surface searched when it had not, and the group’s management 
bears responsibility for the accuracy of its reporting. 
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